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4 
ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION: A STUDY 
OF DOMESTIC INFLUENCE IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION FROM 1989-1993 
Jason Grishkoff 
Economic and monetary union ill Europe was by no means a new idea. Following 
the increased economic division in Europe after World War J, calls had been made for a 
common European currency as early as 1929. However, not until the Suez crisis of 1950, 
~hen France's policy was reoriented towards an economic partnership with Germany, was 
the trend towards economic union set in motion. 1 Shortly after the crisis, the Rome Treaty 
of 1958 officially established the European Economic Conullunity (EEC). While this treaty 
did not initially comprise monetary integration, the issue came up in the early 1960s, never 
to disappea r. 
By 1968, the six founding Member States of the EEC had achieved most of the goals 
laid down in the Rome Treaty, most im.portantly the establishment of a successful customs 
union. The economies of the Member States had become well integrated , conducting about 
half of their trade amongst thenlselves. Policymakers in France suggested that because their 
successes in areas such as the Common Agricultural Policy were largely dependent on stable 
exchange rates, the Community should "be endowed with a common international 
monetary policy."2 One of the best ways to accomplish tllls , they argued, was to create an 
economic and monetary union. 
This article assesses the influence that political parties and the public had over the 
European policy choices made by the elite representatives participating in the development 
of Economic and Monetary Union from 1989 to 1993. It demonstrates that 
Intergovenullentalism and Supranationalism are not, in and of themselves , capable of 
explaining European integration. Rather, it asserts that the Fusion theory, which combines 
elements of both Supranationalism and Intergovenm1entalism, offers a more appropriate 
explanation of EU politics. More significantly, it shows that European executives have 
become more accountabl e for their European policies, and that national pressures are 
capable of indirectly influencing decisions made at th e European level. It concludes, 
however, by confirnllng that the 'democratic deficit' remains a very real issue, parti cularly 
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where the link between national politics and EU level politics is concerned. 
THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND EU POLITICS 
For many years, European scholars attenlpted to create grand theories for the sake of 
comparing the new E U political system to that of government, politics, and policy-making 
in all political systems. Over the years, these grand theories have been replaced by "mid-level 
explanations of cross-systematic political processes [that act as] the intellectual precursors of 
any theory of EU politics."] One of these grand theories, N eofunctionalisl11 , was first 
suggested by Ernst Haas in 1958. The basic claim of N eofunctionalism is that "a given 
action, related to a specific goal, creates a situatio n in which the original goal can be assured 
only by taking furth er actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for m ore, 
and so forth."4 According to this argument, the forces behind this spillover process are non-
state ac tors, such as business associations, trade unions, and political parties, promoting their 
economic and ideological interests. H owever, N eofun ctionalism failed to account for the 
slowing down of E uropean integration in the 1960s, and the strengthening of the 
intergovernmental elements of the E uropean Conll1l1nity (EC). N ew theories had to be 
developed . 
(Liberal) IntClgovCfmf/ cn talisl'I1. D erived from the realist school of international relations, 
Intergovernmentalism argues that European integration is driven by the interests and actions 
of the European nation states with the aim of p rotecting their geopolitical interests, such as 
national security and sovereignty. Intergovernmentalist theory draws on general theories of 
bargaining and negotiation to view the EU as a forum in which interstate bargaining 
outcom es are decisively shaped by the relative power of nation-states. This relative power 
among states is arguably shaped by asymmetrical interdependence. In this model, 
governments that stand to benefit the most from an agreement relative to their alternatives 
tend to offer greater compromises. 5 This pursuit of national self-interest , strategic rationality, 
and policy outcomes dependent on relative power, can attribute for the continued 
cooperation between states within the EU bargaining arena. In this model, policymaking is 
seen as taking the shape of a " unidirectional causal chain beginning with the preferences of 
societal actors and powerful constituencies and translated through the state to the national 
interests and positions w hich are then represented in Brussels negotiations."6 
Liberal-Intergovernmentalis11l, first argued for by M oravcsik, divides the EU decision 
making process into two stages: in the first there is a demand for EU policies from dom estic 
economic and social actors; in the second sta ge EU poli cies are supplied by 
intergovernmental bargains, such as treaty refo rms. As in classic Intergovernmentalism, 
M ember States are still treated as unitary actors and the supranational institutions of the EU 
have a limited impact on final outcom es. Liberal-Intergoverrunentalism differs in that it 
argues state preferences are driven by economic rather than geopolitical interests, that state 
preferences are not fixed, and that states ' preferences vary from issue to issue. 7 
While Intergovernmentalist theories present a plausible explanation for the manner in 
which M ember States come to decide on and adopt conlllon European policies, they face 
a number of criticisms. In particular, these criticisms are aimed at their accounts of 
preference formation and their understanding of decision making in the council. It has been 
argued that Intergovernmentalism fails to account for negotiation, bargaining, or conflict 
between ministries, ministers, and/or officials, each with their own constituencies and 
clienteles.8 C ritics point out that the state executives are pressured by the policy initiatives 
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of the supranational E uropean Commission (EC) , and influenced by the anticipated 
reactions and possible positions of o ther international actors. 9 T hose same critics, naturally, 
have proposed their own theories about the way in w hich Europe is Europeanizing. 
Supral1ationaiisl'Il. Some theorists attempt to account for criticisms of 
Intergovernmentalisrn by arguing for a Supranational interpretation of the EU. They view 
the EU as a complex institutional and policy environment, with multiple and ever changing 
interests and actors, as well as limited infonnation about the long-term implications of treaty 
reforms or day-to-day legislative or executive decisions. T hey claim that the Member State 
govermnents are not in full control , and that the supranational institutions exert significant 
independent influence on institutional policy outcomes. This conceptualization argues that 
" the EU [is] a network in w hich individual member states are increasingly defined not by 
themselves but in relation to their EU partners, and in which they prefer to interact with 
one another rather than third parties because those interacti ons create incentives for self-
interested cooperation ." I 0 
In this model , M ember States have realized that there is more to gain by working 
within the system than by going at it by themselves. l ! T he increased administrative 
interaction between national officials has arguably brought abo ut a fu sion of member state 
bureaucracies. Consequ ently, civil servants no longer act as 'guard dogs' of national interests 
when considering EU policy. Instead , they see Brussels as an arena in which routine 
decisions are taken and the offi cials of o ther Member States are partners. 12 
H owever, M oravcsik contends that the entrepreneurship of supranational officials 
tends to be futil e and redundant, as "governments generally find it easy to act as their own 
entrepreneurs and to impose distributional bargains through the use of traditional 
nonmilitary instruments of power politics ... The distributive outcomes of negotiations have 
refl ected not the preferences of supranational acto rs but the pattern of asymmetrical 
interdependence among policy preferences." 13 O ther critics assert that the creation and 
evolution of tlus supranational institution as a step in the direction of a type of Euro-
federalism. 
Fusion Theory. By approaching Europeanization in terms of the problems which it 
poses and the opportUluties it creates for domestic political management, theorists have been 
able to reconcile the differences between national adaptation and national convergence, 
providing a framework in which both Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism can 
coexist. 14 The governments of Member states "must find the m eans to reconcile potentially 
contradicto ry E uropean and do mestic pressures, as regards both substantive policy choices 
and broader discourses of legitimation." 15 In certain circumstances, particular M ember 
States nuy be faced with having to implement policy choices that enjoy little domestic 
suppo rt. However, these M ember States may also find that the opportunity structures of 
policy-m aking in the EU have been changed in a manner which lllay be positively utilized 
by national governments. 16 R obert Putnam's 'two-level games' model views European 
bargaining as under a double constraint: national governments must make policy decisions 
that are acceptable both domestically and internationalIy.17 As such , it is possible for 
Member States to use dom estic opposition as leverage for bargaining in European 
negotiations. 
Along this same vein of thinking, M aurer and Wessels have posited a fusion theory 
that helps to identify interrelated processes of Europeanization between M ember States and 
E U institutions, and national and European adnunistrative system s. They argue that 
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[both] levels of interaction (Council Secretariat and permanent representatio ns 
at the EU level and m ember state institutions and representatives from the 
national level) meet in a range of committee structures that co-ordinate the 
views and opinions of member state and EC / EU administrations on a given set 
of issues. Fusion theory would then expect that these arenas would act neither 
as the 'guard dogs' of national governments charged with controlling the 
European Commission nor as forums for exclusively intergovernmental 
bargaining. 18 
Tlus theory has much in common with the view of E uropealuzation as problem and 
opportunity for domestic political managem ent: both see natio nal representatives to the EU 
as having to balance the interests of domestic and internatio nal pressures witho ut putting 
too heavy an emphasis o n either. While areas such as the Conmuttee for Home and Judicial 
Affairs or the C FSP cOlllnuttee are perhaps m ore representative of intergovernmental 
bargailung theory, I argue that the decision-making process of Econonuc and M onetary 
Union falls in line with Fusion T heory. 
THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 
C ritics of the lack of democratic legitimacy in the EU point to the mode of political 
representation and the nature of policy outputs. They argue that European integration has 
reduced the representational qualities of Europea n dem ocracies by concentrating an 
increasing amount of decisions in what is an executive dominated political system .19, :W 
Actions taken at this European executive level are arguably beyond the control of national 
parliaments, as they "are much more isolated from national parliamentary scrutiny and 
control than are national cabinet nunisters or bureaucrats in the dOlnestic policy-making 
p rocess. As a result, goven mlents can effectively ignore their parliaments when m aking 
decisions in Brussels."21 A notable response to this claim has com e from Andrew M o ravcsik , 
who argues that the European Union has in fact made Executives m ore accountable to their 
citizens. He notes that the actions of government ministers are no longer scrutinized simply 
at home, but in a wider European context, and that nunisters at hom e are no longer held 
to account solely for their domesti c record, but also for their actions in Brussels. 22 
T he EP is the only branch of the EU that is directly elected. Though stronger than it 
once was, critics still claim that it is weak compared to the governments in the C o uncil. 23. 
24, 25 Furthermore, neither national elections nor EP elections are 'European' elections: they 
are fought on domestic ra ther than European issues, and parties collude to keep the issue of 
Europe off the domestic agenda .26. 27 The consequ ences are that EU citizens' preferences 
"on issues on the EU policy agenda at best have only an indirect influence on EU policy 
outcomes."28 Contrary to this, Moravcsik emphasizes the fact that the EP now has veto-
power over the selection of the Commission, and that legislation requires a majoriry support 
in both the Council and the Ep 2lJ 
Further claims of dem ocratic deficit show that the European Union is either too far 
rem oved trom electoral controls, or too complex for citizens of the member states to 
understand and form reasoned opinions about. 30 In addition to the complexiry o f the 
process it is also argued that EU policies are overly technical and discourage citizens trom 
engaging with the process. O n top of all this, theorists argue that the system lacks 
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transparency. According to these arguments, the end result is that the EU has alienated 
European citizens with serious repercussions for both the traditional democratic ideal of a 
citizenry educated in the governmental process, and the ideal of government actors 
accountable to the general public. Moravcsik counters this argument by claiming that the 
EU policy-making process is more transparent than most domestic systems of 
governrnent. 31 
Lastly and usually in accordance with some or all of the above arguments, various 
critics claim that the policies decided upon at the European level are not representative of 
the . preferences of European voters. Critics argue that "governments are able to undertake 
policies at the European level that they cannot pursue at the domestic level , where they are 
constrained by parliaments, courts and corporatist interest group structures."32 Moravcsik 
counters that the EU's elaborate system of checks-and-balances ensures that an 
overwhelming consensus is required for any policies to be agreed. H e asserts that EU 
policies are the result of a compromise between all interest parties, from all Members States 
and all the main party oppositions. Only those on the extremes are excluded. 33 
Conversely, Majone argues that the EU is essentially a 'regulatory state,' by which 
Pareto-eHicient outcomes (where some benefit and no one is nude worse of}) are the 
result. 34, 35 He asserts that EU policy-making should not be 'democratic' in the usual 
m eaning of the term because an EU dominated by the EP or directly elected institutions 
would lead to a politicization of regulatory policy-making. This politicization would result 
in redistributive rather than Pareto-efficient outcomes, and thus undermine the legitim.acy 
of the EU.36, 37, 38 Rather than make fundamental changes, he asserts that the EU should 
instead implement more transparent decision-making. Similarly, Moravcsik makes three 
daims to support isolation of the EU policy-making process. First, he asserts that "universal 
involvement in government policy is beyond the scope of any modern citizen."39 Secondly, 
isolating quasi-judicial decisions is essential to the protection of minority interests and the 
aversion of a tyranny of the majority. Third, isolated policy-makers can correct for a bias 
inherent in majoritarian contests. In this view, then, "the EU ITlay be more 'representative' 
precisely because it is , in a narrow sense, less 'democratic' ."40 
INTERPRETING THE RESULTS 
The following section provides a brief outline of six case studies discussed at greater 
length in the original Honors Thesis submitted to the UCSD Department of Political 
Science. 
Case1: Thatcher's eviction. Because Thatcher (EDV1) was not responsive to public 
opinion or political parties, partisan pressures in Parliament forced her to resign. How were 
political parties, particularly the Conservative party, able to remove her from power, 
effectively changing the United Kingdom's stance on EMU? 
According to Howe, Thatcher's demise came about as a result of "the poll tax, her 
mounting unpopularity on the doorstep, [and] personal dismay at her whole 'style of 
governnlent'; all these came ahead of concern about her attitude towards Europe."41 
Discontent with Thatcher's policy was first voiced by the public in the 1989 EP elections, 
when the Labour Party enjoyed its first victory since the Conservative rise to power in 
1979. Yet Thatcher remained unresponsive to growing pro-European sentiment in the 
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United Kingdom, continuing her isolationist policy. 
The British government's parliamentary system requires that the Prime Minister have 
the support of the majority in the House of COl1lllOl1 S. As T hatcher's policy decisions 
continued to increase tensions within her Conservative Party, her grip on the m aj ori ty 
began to slip. The final blow came when a leading Conservative figure, Geoffrey H owe, gave 
his resignation speech , in which he claimed her isolatio nist approach to EMU would have 
'grave' ramifications fo r England. 42 With the passing of a vote of no confidence, the 
m embers of Parliam ent were able to renlOve Thatcher from power. Thus government 
structure provided political parties (IV2) with an effective m eans by which they could exert 
pressure on and eventually rernove T hatcher. While the public had not played an immediate 
part in this vote of no confidence, their outspoken discontent with T hatcher's dom estic 
policy added further legitimacy to the Conservative Party's decision. H ad Conservative 
voters within the public supported Thatcher's dom estic policy, m embers within the 
Conservative Party would likely have been constrained by their constituents from passing a 
vote of no confidence. 
Therefore, I conclude that broad discontent within both the public (IVI ) and political 
parties (IV2) for T hatcher 's domestic and European policy decisions (EDV1) provided the 
impetus for the Conservative Party to use a vote of no confidence to efltx tively rem ove her 
from power. Thus, by ho lding Thatcher responsible, the British parliament demonstrates that 
representative elites to the E U can be held accountable by national legislative bodies. 
Casc:?: Major oufmancuI'crs over public and party. John Major was able to use public 
opinio n (IV1) to ratify M aastricht in the face oppositio n from within the then maj ori ty 
Conservative Party (IV2). H ow was this possible when neither the public, nor the maj ority 
Conservative Party approved of Maastricht? 
I argue that the answer can be found in the fact that both the public and Party 
approved of Major's dom estic policies . One month before T hatcher's resignation , opinion 
polls showed Labour 16% ahead of the C onservatives .43 Yet in the 1992 elections, M aj or 
reversed the situation , bringing the Conservative Party a 7 .5% margin of victory over 
Labour. This shift dem onstrates that where Thatcher lacked the suppo rt of public opinion, 
M aj or enjoyed it. 
When Conservative R ebels (IV2) attempted to j oin Labour in rej ecting the 
ratification of M aastricht in Parliam ent, Major was able to appeal to the partisan loyalty of 
their constituents, fo rcing them to vote in line with their Conservative Party, and thus 
approve the Treaty. 44 Even though neither public opinion nor political parties supported 
M ajor's European policy, approval of his domestic policy was such that he was able to 
m aintain their overall support , and thus did not have to change his EMU policy decisions. 
Therefore, one can argue that the preferences of domestic actors were not represented by 
M aj or, giving credence to the argument of a democratic deficit. 
Mitterrand 's N ear Catastrophe. As President of France during the development of EMU 
policy and M aastricht ratification, Mitterrand's European policy (FDV1) was supported by 
public opinion (IV1) , as evidenced through the high levels of stable support for EU 
unification and COlTl1no n currency up to ratification . Furthermore, Mitterrand's European 
policy was not challenged by the Parties (IV2) that made up the national assembly or senate. 
H owever, Mitterrand's failure to use direct consultation almost resulted in the rej ection of 
his European policy. 
This case is interesting in that we see a drastic and negative change in the European 
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policy preference of the public. To determine why, it is important that we look into the 
factors that made 48.95% of the population the vote 'no'. According to Mazzucelli , "57% 
voted ' no' because of the loss of French sovereignty implied . . . 55% voted 'no' in order not 
to leave Europe in the hands of Brussels technocrats. Another 40% voted 'no ' out of fear of 
German dorninance. M ost significantly, 31 % voted 'no' to reject the entire French political 
establishment."45 As can be seen, m ost of those who voted 'no ' did so to dem onstrate 
dissatisfacti on with Mitterrand's European policy: his willingness to give away France's 
sovereignty and put it in the hands of Brussels technocrats. T his growing dissatisfaction was 
further delllonstr.lted in the disaster of the 1992 regio nal elections and the catastrophic 
defeat of the Left in the 1993 legislative election, when the Socialist Party obtained its worst 
electoral result since the 1960s. Thus, we see a dip in bo th European policy approval and 
domestic policy approval. While the majority the public and those in parties approved of 
Mitterrand 's decisions, it can be said that the growing discontent amongst the public 
presented a very real possibility of change. 
Case 4: Kohl Plays the W.l iting Game. As C hancellor of Germany, Helmut Kohl's 
European policy (GDV1) was constrained by the public (IV1 ) in the 1989 German EP 
elections. While the vote demonstrated that the maj ority of the public approved of Kohl's 
domestic and European policies, the sm all proportion that voted for the Republicans was 
influential enough to threaten the m aj ority hold of Kohl's CDU/ CSU Party in the 
Bundestag. Because the Republican Party ran almost entirel y on an anti-EC platform, one 
can assume that those who voted for them were expressing discontent with Kohl 's European 
policy. The results constrained Kohl from pushing ahead with further decision-making, as he 
was worried that provoking a debate on E MU would furth er tarnish his already suffering 
public reputation. 
Kohl's weariness paid off, when, in the D ecember 1990 unificati on elections, the 
public voted to reelect him, thus allowing him to act autonomously when making European 
decisions. T he focus of tlus election was principally German unification; European issues 
were hardly mentioned. While this is a comparatively weak case in demonstrating the 
influence of the public over a DV (as they did not change his decisions, but m erely made him 
wait to act), it demonstrates the importance of approval of domestic policies as a 
deternunant factor. 
Case5: Kohl trumps public disapproval. C hancellor Kohl (GDV1) was able to assert the 
decisions made on EMU in Maastricht negotiations with overwhelnung support from 
parties in the Bundestag and Bundesrat. While the public was presented a channel for 
challenging the decisions made by Kohl through Constitutional Court, they were unable to 
legitinuze their anti-EMU stance. 
T his case differs from the previous cases in that public opiluon seem s to have had little 
direct bearing on the o utcom e. The German Bundestag and Bundesrat overwhelnungly 
supported Kohl's EMU policy decisions. The fact that Kohl required approval from the main 
legislative bodies of the Germ.an government provides evidence that counters the 
democratic deficit claim that elite representatives to the EU are beyond the control of 
national parliaments. The support of the Bundestag and Bundesrat also allowed the Kohl 
government to avoid direct public consultation. 
With no election on the horizon, Kohl 's government would not have been overly 
concerned about any potential dip in their approval rating. Further quelling these fears was 
the fact that the public at the time approved of Kohl's domestic policies. Because elections 
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are primarily focused on domestic issues, a contrary European policy would not necessarily 
threaten Kohl 's hold on power. T hus, even though the public did not agree with Ko hl and 
the parties in regdrds to European policy, their support of his party 's domestic policy was 
such that there was no fea r about disagreeing with them. 
Case 6: Danish r~ferendum rejects Maastrich t. Danish Prime Minister Schluter (DkDV 1) 
was made to change decisions on EM U in M aastricht negotiations because political parties 
(IV2) prevented him ti-om securing the five- sixths majority in Parliament needed to avoid 
a referendum, and because the subsequent public referendum (IV1) on Maastricht narrowly 
fa iled. 
In Denmark 's Parliament, a bill must achieve a five-sixths maj ori ty to approve the 
delegatio n of national powers to international authoriti es witho ut a referendum. B ut 
because tllis m'Uority was not reached, the decision was put directly into the hands of the 
public by m eans of a referendum. T he fact that the Danish Folketing was able to rej ect the 
decisions of Schli.iter provides evidence contrary to the democrati c deficit argument that 
representative elites to the EU are not held accountable fo r their actions by natio nal 
parliam ents. When the referendum rolled around, the public voted to rej ect ratificatio n of 
M aastricht. The reason for the Danish 'no ' was m ainly related to Euro pean 
ConU1ll1nity / European Unio n issues, and not dissatisfaction with their leaders or for ulterio r 
motives. 46 Therefore, it can be said that regardless of whether the public approved of 
dom estic policy, they joined the parties in disapproving of European policy. The combined 
disapproval of these two allowed them to change the DV appropriately. 
D elle/oping a Theory. T he results of the study demonstrate that if public opinio n (IV1) 
and political parties (IV2) are aligned, and there is disapproval of the (European policy 
decisions/ stances ot) DV, then the DV will change (Case 1, Case 4, Case 6). Conversely, 
where public opinion (IV1) and political parties (IV2) are aligned , and there is approval of 
(European policy decisions/stances o t) DV, then DV will remain unchanged (Case 3). It was 
also demonstrated that where public opinion (IVI) and political parties (IV2) are unaligned , 
the approval of the domestic policies of policymakers becornes an important factor. Because 
politicians are strategic actors, they must ride party or public opinion. Thus, if the public and 
parties are not aligned over European policy but do both approve of domestic policy, elite 
policym akers can assert their European policy without fear of losing any impending 
elections or the confidence of their party (Case 2, 5). Conversely, if there is disapproval of 
domestic policies from either, the DV will be forced to change. For further discussion , see 
complete Thesis. 
IMPLICATIONS 
The goal of this study was to assess the influence that the public and political parties 
have over the European policy choices made by their elite represen ta tives to the European 
Union. Research was narrowed to the impact that public opinion and political parties 
within France, England, Germany, and Denmark had on elite policynukers participating in 
the supranational development of Econonlic and M onetary Union (EMU) . 
This study shows that there exist elem ents of democratic connection under certain 
conditio ns, w hereby elites participating in EU policymaking are responsive to what political 
parties and the public w ithin their M ember State advocate. While in some regards this 
reailinns standard views of the European political system , it also serves to add additional 
complexities to the debate. T he following pages address some of these implications. 
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bnplications Jar Theories Ilf European Integration and Politics. In its simplest form, 
Intergovernmentalism asserts that European integration is driven by the interest and actions 
of elites in European Member States, who act to protect their geopolitical interests, such as 
national security and sovereignty. These geopolitical interests are arguably shaped by the 
preferen ces of societal actors , such as parties and the public. Liberal-Intergovernmentalism, 
a more updated theory posited by Moravcsik, m aintains that econom.ic, rather than 
geopolitical interests, are the driving forces behind the decisions made by these 
representatives. 47 The results of tills study show that the impetus for EMU was provided by 
both geopolitically and economically-driven elites from within Member States, particularly 
France and Germany. It further shows that in many cases, these elites were constrained by, 
and acted in accordallce with, the interests of societal actors. However, the fact that the 
guidelines for EMU policy were supplied by the supranational Delors Report. rather than 
by national actors m aking intergovernmental bargains, lends support to Sandholtz 's 
counterargument, namely that state executives are pressured by the policy initiatives of the 
supranational European Commission (EC).48 Furthermore, we also see that in many of 
these cases the preferen ces of societal actors did not, and often could not influence the 
preferen ces of elite policym.akers . The results of this study thus imply that the 
Intergoverl1l11entalist bottom- up approach to EU integration cannot, on its own, provide an 
adequate explanation for the relationship between domestic actors and representative elites. 
The essential claim of Supranationalisll1 is that M ember States are not in fi.llI control. 
Rather, it is the supranational EU institutions that exert significant independent influence 
on institutional policy outcomes. The domestic implications of this theory are that the 
bureaucracies of Member States have become fused together, and most pertinent to this 
study, that there has been a dilution of national preferences in tavor of European 
partnersillp.49 While the tact that the Delors Committee set the guidelines tor EMU does 
support this theory, this study reaffirms Moravcsik 's contention that it is not necessarily the 
European institutions that always set the tempo for integrationist policy. A glaring example 
of this was made by Denmark's first Maastricht referendum, whereby national actors were 
able to counter EMU guidelines, providing, and ultimately implem enting their own 
exceptions to the Treaty. Similarly, the claim that there has been a dilution of national 
interests is countered by the fact that, in some cases, domestic actors were able to assert their 
national preferences and constrain or change the decisions that their national elites made 
when negotiating in the EU. Therefore, it can be argued that Supranationalisl1l does not 
provide an adequate explanation of the interaction between domestic actors and national 
elites, or of that between elites and the institutions of the ED. 
Fusion Theory claims that governments of Member States must find the means to 
reconcile potentially contradictory European and domestic pressures. 50 Essentially, there 
persists a ' two-level ' constraint by which national governments must lIlake policy decisions 
that are acceptable both domestically and internationally. 51 Thus, rather than attempt to 
explain European politics as either solely Supranationalist or Intergoverl1l11entalist, Fusion 
Theory reconciles the two, viewing elites as ac tors stuck in the middle: they must act in the 
interest of national preferences, willIe at the sanle time attempting to account for the 
pressures placed on them by European institutions. While it is possible to contend that 
Thatcher did not attempt to resolve her European policies with either EU or domestic 
pressures, the fact that tills contributed to her downfall as Prime Minister lends credence to 
the argument that successful governments must reconcile the two if they wish to contribute 
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to EU policies. Thus, the results of this study do not provide evidence contrary to this 
theory. Rather, they reaffirm that indeed, both supranational and national pressures playa 
vital role in determining the policy outcomes of EU negotiation . 
il11plicatiol15 for the Democratic Deficit. One of the primary arguments for the lack of 
dernocratic legitimacy in the EU is that European integration has reduced the 
representational qualities of European democracies by concentrating an increasing amount 
of decisions in what is an executive dominated political system. 52. 53 Actions taken at this 
European executive level are arguably beyond the control of national parliaments, as they 
"a re llIuch 1lI0re isolated frolll national parliamentary scrutiny and control than are national 
cabinet ministers or bureaucrats in the domestic policy-making process. As a result , 
governments can effectively ignore their parliaments when making decisions in Brussels."54 
On one hand, this study has made it apparent that permissive consensus allows elites to avoid 
democratic consultation wllile the supranational decision-making process is taking place. At 
the same time, however, the results align with Moravcsik 's counterargument that the 
European Union has in fact made executives more accountable to their citizens.55 One such 
example of national parliaments keeping a check on the actions of their representative elites 
occurred when the British Parliament's held Thatcher responsible not simply at home, but 
also in a wider European context. It seems, therefore, that while there is little democratic 
consultation , the actions taken at the European executive level are not necessarily beyond 
the control of national parliaments. 
Wllile the EP is the only branch of the EU that is directly elected, critics have 
demonstrated that it is weak compared to the governments in the Council.56, 57, 58 Neither 
national elections nor EP electio ns are 'European' elections: they are fought on domestic 
rather than European issues, and parties collude to keep the issue of Europe off the domestic 
agenda S9 ,60 The consequences are that EU citizens' preferences "on issues on the EU policy 
agenda at best have only an indirect influence on EU policy outcomes."61 While, this study 
confirms a lack of genuine 'European' elections, it also demonstrates that the public can 
utilize elections as effective means by which to constrain the European policy decisions of 
their national elites. As demonstrated in the 1989 EP elections in Germany, negative results 
persuaded Kohl to take a different approach to EMU. Sinlilarly, the Conservative Party's loss 
in the 1989 British EP elections demonstrated public disapproval with Thatcher's European 
policy. While these elections did not directly result in a change of her policy, they marked 
the beginning of her downfall as Prime Minister. It can be argued, thus, that the indirect 
influence of elections is very real , regardless of their lacking a European focus. At the sam e 
time, however, this indirect influence confirms the EPs inability to directly act as a legitimate 
democratic institution. 
Further claims of democratic deficit show that the European Union is either too far 
removed from electoral controls, or too complex for citizens of the 11lember states to 
understand and form reasoned opinions about.62 According to such arguments, the EU has 
alienated European citizens with serious repercussions for both the traditional democratic 
ideal of a citizenry educated in the governmental process, and the ideal of government 
actors accountable to the general public. Moravcsik counters this argument by clainling that 
the EU policy-making process is more transparent than most domestic systems of 
government.63 While the results of this study do not directly address this aspect of the 
democratic deficit , they do in many ways confirm the detrimental consequences of this 
problem. For example, low EP election turnout can be attributed to the indifference of 
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voters towards European issues, indirectly compounding their already lacking democratic 
nature. Furthermore, voter alienation may account for the persuadability of the European 
public, the consequences of which can be seen in France's M aastricht referendum, whereby 
the decisions of Mitterrand, who had eqjoyed one of the largest European policy approval 
ratings in Europe, was nearly vetoed at the last moment by those opposed to ratification. 
Thus, it can be seen that by distancing itself from European citizens, the EU has threatened 
the traditional democratic ideal of citizenry educated in the governmental process. 
Finally, the results of this study substantiate the claim that policies decided upon at the 
European level are not representative European voter preferences. In the majori ty of cases 
studied in this paper, it can be seen that the public did not support the European policies 
decided on by their elite representatives. In some cases, these decisions were amended so as 
to represent the interests of the public. In others they were not. T his raises an important 
question: In such a vast and complex system , can the interests and preferences of every 
individual actor be reconciled? At the moment, the answer seem s to be a definitive no. For 
now, it appears that policies in the EU will must come abo ut as a result of comprOlnises 
between interest parties from all the M embers States and all the main party oppositions.64 
Implicatiolls for the Future. The evidence against Intergove rnmentalism and 
Supranationalsm should not be taken to mean that these theories are absolutely right or 
wrong, but rather, that we're dealing with a very complex political system. T he true value 
for political scientists lies in identifying subtle ways tlut these m odels can help us interpret 
the evidence, and how the evidence helps us reinterpret them. 
M ore importantly, this study has demonstrated that European executives have becom e 
m ore accountable for their European policies, and that national pressures are capable of 
indirectly influencing policy decisions at the European level. At the same time however, it 
seems that the link between national politics and EU level politics is considerably weak. 
While the directly elected EP does attempt to reconcile this problem , it does not do so 
effectively. To ensure that the dem ocratic nature of the EU is improved, further research 
must be done to advance our understanding of the true nature of the 'democratic defici t' . 
While tllis study has contributed some valuable knowledge to theories ofEU politics 
and the democratic defi cit debate, it does not necessarily paint an accurate picture of the 
European Union today. Because it is difficult to gather evidence regarding the inner 
workings of the EU until many years after the fact , this study focused on the period of EMU 
development between 1989 and 1993. Since then, many changes have been made. Thus this 
study should serve as a work that future researchers can refer back to when attempting to 
m easure the successes and gains of the European Union as an ever increasingly successful 
democratic institution. 
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